Political Commentary

Peace with Pakistan
To expect a breakthrough from the very first encounter would be unrealistic

IT was sudden and dramatic. And let's face it, it also meant a reversal of the earlier policy of not talking to Pakistan until "cross-border terrorism" in Jammu and Kashmir had ceased. But there is no doubt that Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee's invitation to General Pervez Musharraf for sweeping parleys at the summit in New Delhi has the country's broad support, some misgivings here and there notwithstanding.

On the other side of the subcontinental divide, too, the situation is encouraging. The military regime has reacted positively to the prime minister's initiative which, interestingly, was accompanied by his decision to call off what is erroneously called the "unilateral ceasefire in J&K".

New Delhi's somewhat convoluted official position is that it has ended the "non-initiation of combat operations (NICO)". For, these had failed to produce the desired results over the last six months.

To nobody's surprise, the Pakistani government, even while welcoming the Vajpayee invitation, has sharply criticised the end to the ceasefire. But there is a clear contradiction in the Pakistani stand, as voiced by its Foreign Minister, Mr. Abdul Sattar.

According to him the "so-called ceasefire was a sham" from the start. If so, why mourn its demise? But then polemics of this kind have become a part and parcel of exchanges between the two neighbours that are somehow unable to become friends.

Jehadi outfits

It is also possible that some India-bashing even at a promising juncture is a sop that Islamabad has to offer to the jehadi outfits which are opposed to talks with India. But that is not the only problem. On both sides there is also an irrepressible proclivity to be one up on the other.

Most Pakistanis are claiming that their policy has triumphed. Quite a few Indians are boasting, on the other hand, that this country has "called Gen. Musharraf's bluff" or put him "in a cleft-stick". But this is not all.

At a more serious level, the Pakistani High Commissioner in New Delhi has tried to queer the pitch by proclaiming that a plebiscite in Kashmir is the only route to peace between the two countries. He has chosen to do so at a time when Mr. Vajpayee's offer of talks is wholly unconditional.

Mercifully, there are two positive straws in the wind. One, the agenda is not proving to be a problem even tough New Delhi emphasises the composite agenda of eight points - including Kashmir, security and terrorism - and Pakistan persists with its standard line that Kashmir is the "core issue". Secondly - and no less importantly - the hurdle of the Hurriyat's participation in the coming conversations is out of the way.

For much too long, both the Hurriyat and Islamabad had gone on harping on "tripartite talks", with the Hurriyat sitting in at the negotiating table as "the sole representative" of the Kashmiri opinion.

All concerned have now given up this absurd position. Pakistan now says that the Hurriyat should be involved in the dialogue "at some stage, in some manner" but it has no place in the bilateral talks between the Indian Prime Minister and the Pakistani Chief Executive.

To some extent New Delhi must share the blame for inflating the Hurriyat's importance and making this outfit, consisting of disparate elements, look larger than life. Moreover, the Hurriyat has never taken part in elections and its representative credentials are questionable, to say the least.

There is much to be said for Mr. Shabir Shah's proposal that while Kashmiris must be consulted in finding a solution of the Kashmir problem, a free and fair election must be held first. This alone can decide who has the right to speak on behalf of the state's people.

In any case, Pakistan ought to be a little circumspect in its overblown talk about the people. For the people of Pakistan have no say in the present dispensation there, as both the PPP and the Muslim League, whose support among the masses is an established fact, will testify.

Moreover, if the Hurriyat and other Kashmiri groups must be consulted, why must people of the Northern Areas and so-called Azad Kashmir, under Pakistani occupation, be left out? Some squabbling on this score and several others will doubtless go on. But the key question is where do we go from here?

The first and foremost point both India and Pakistan have to bear in mind is that making peace between any two countries is a process, often long and painful, and not an event, no matter how dramatic. To expect a breakthrough from the very first encounter between Mr. Vajpayee and Gen. Musharraf would be to fly in the face of realism.

Such is the deadweight of history over the last half a century and so thick the overlay of bitterness and distrust on it that to make any advance at all will be a very long and difficult haul. The high road the prime minister has talked of so eloquently is strewn with massive obstructions and deadly potholes. Patience and perseverance are the two virtues both sides need.

We can take a lesson not only from the Lahore fiasco - the bus got diverted, alas, to Kargil - but also from the horrific developments in West Asia. There is a most detailed treaty, signed eight years ago by Yitzak Rabin and Mr. Yasser Arafat and underwritten by the United States. And yet the whole exercise has gone up in smoke, almost literally.

A reasonable framework for carrying on the India-Pakistan dialogue exists under the Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration, the latter now subscribed to by Gen. Musharraf though he had earlier tried to trash it. But the two sides have to come to terms with one stark reality of life. Talks held in the full glare of the international media have serious limitations. The participants have to tailor their private positions and public pronouncements to the prevailing public opinion.

One can be sure that the Vajpayee-Musharraf summit will be turned in to media circus. Even so, the two leaders owe it to themselves, to their people who are craving for peace and to history to make an earnest beginning towards rapprochement. They should then issue clear guidelines to their subordinates to take up the nitty-gritty of peacemaking in talks about which there is no great hype.

The really productive negotiations can take place, however, only in complete secrecy, away from the media's prying eyes and ears. Time was when I was a staunch believer in the Wilsonian principle of "open covenants, openly arrived at".

Experience, including that of the Israelis and the Palestinians in 1992-93 has shown, however, that over highly emotive and sensitive issues, worthwhile agreements can be reached only secretly. Once concluded, these covenants must be made public and duly ratified by the people through parliament.

American pressure

One other point needs to be discussed with complete candour. There is a rather widespread view that the sudden initiatives by Mr. Vajpayee - unknown to the foreign policy machine and even to most cabinet ministers - is the result of international, principally American, pressure. Whether pressure is the right expression to use in this context is debatable.

But there is no doubt that international opinion has been strongly in favour of a resumption of the Indo-Pakistani dialogue and for its continuance without interruption. Heads of state and government visiting New Delhi or Islamabad or both have said so openly, as has the UN secretary-general, Mr. Kofi Anan. To factor this into the making of policy is not succumbing to foreign pressure.

However, there are some disturbing intimations in New Delhi's unusually cool air, including some from the foreign policy establishment, that it would do us no harm to have some foreign "facilitator" for India-Pakistani talks.

The idea is premature at best and dangerous at worst. India is still paying a heavy price for having gone to the UN in the hope of getting justice and receiving power politics instead. To be sure, circumstances have changed since then.

The Cold War is over. There are signs of change in America's South Asia policies. But how these tentative changes in approach will jell remains to be seen. No third party meddling in the bilateral process should be thought of at this stage.